|
||||||
| Forums FAQ | Members List | Search | Today's Posts | Mark Forums Read |
| Tech News Breaking and important technical news developments |
![]() |
|
|
|
LinkBack | Thread Tools | Display Modes |
|
|||
|
You appear to be reading far too much into that wikipaedia article. Obviously any development on OS/2 would have eventually followed on with the next version number, but it's never certain until the actual announcement date. The article is vague about what happened during the five years or so of development (NT released 1993). The phrase "still unreleased NT OS/2" is just that - unreleased. You called it "internal" version (whatever that means). Internal stuff is notoriously unreliable as evidence, not open to public scrutiny, and doesn't get tested as evidence should. Separate development after the split would have caused the products to diverge, unless you were privy to the developments at the time, you only have Wikipaedia's somewhat ambiguous statements. That's a dangerous source given that it's well known for what it often it leaves out, which can be misleading.
|
|
||||
|
PS: expecting yet again the "hero in my own mind" comment...
__________________
My site: http://microchip.bplaced.net My repo: http://download.opensuse.org/repositories/home:/microchip8 SUSE Unbound Forum: http://suseunbound.lefora.com Do coders dream of sheep() ? |
|
||||||
|
Quote:
A blast from the past.Quote:
This bit's so SB (or did I mean BS?): Quote:
Quote:
Quote:
As for your most recent post but one, you could say that about the "lifting" of IBM's OS/2 product, but I couldn't possibly comment, except on your latest point: Quote:
|
|
||||
|
Initial versions of Windows were very bad, but Microsoft kept promising that a better product would come out Real Soon Now, still as part of their joint OS/2 efforts with IBM. Until one day, that is, when suddenly they turned their backs on OS/2. They cried "innovation" and went back to DOS in spite of earlier having admitted it to be obsolete. Then they went and dropped out of the collaboration with IBM entirely, taking with them a lot of IBM technology that had ended up in Windows, which they now suddenly positioned as the operating system of the future. They never even mentioned their earlier promises about OS/2 again.
Microsoft already sold applications for the Apple Macintosh. This gave them a good look under the hood of Apple's operating system software, and enabled them to muscle Apple into granting them a license for portions of the MacUI. (They threatened to withdraw all Mac applications, unless Apple would grant them a license to use MacUI code to port Macintosh apps to the PC.) They then raided MacUI for extra ideas. The remaining few bits (e.g. the font technology they later called TrueType) they bought, occasionally bartering vaporware that later failed to materialize. They also threw in a random collection of small applications, completely unrelated to an operating system (e.g. Paintbrush) which they had bought from various sources to flesh things out a bit. The resulting mixed bag of bits and pieces was massaged into an end product and released as Windows 3.0. It was not too difficult for Microsoft to adapt the Apple versions of Word and Excel to run on Windows 3. There is some indication that Windows was adapted to Word and Excel as much as Word and Excel were adapted to Windows. By the time Windows 3.0 hit the market, competing application developers had already put their R&D money into OS/2 versions of their products, on the assumption that OS/2 would be delivered as promised by the IBM/Microsoft partnership. And now OS/2 did not materialize. But a blown R&D budget was only half the problem. Even if most of the application manufacturers had been wealthy enough to fund two separate development efforts to upgrade their DOS products, there was not enough time to do the Windows version before Windows' projected release date. The fact that the Windows API had not been published in any permanent form yet didn't help either. Without a good API (Application Program Interface) specification, an application developer is not able to interface with the operating system or with other software products. This essentially prevents application development. And Microsoft was the only application vendor at the time who knew enough about the Windows API to come up with market-ready Windows applications. So Microsoft shipped both an OS and an application suite for it, several months before anyone else in the applications market had a chance to catch up with Microsoft's last-moment switch to Windows - and that was that. All those who had expected to sail with the IBM/Microsoft alliance missed the boat, when Microsoft suddenly and deliberately decided to cast off earlier and in another direction than they had originally promised. Most of the independent application vendors never recovered. IBM eventually went on to release their own version of OS/2, and botched it completely. This is partially due to the fact that by the time OS/2 hit the market, that market had already been taken away from them by Microsoft, especially because most application developers had committed themselves to Windows by then. They used Windows development tools, which produced code that was extremely hard to port to another OS. Native OS/2 application software remained scarce, and hardware support was even a bigger problem. Even so, IBM remains responsible for much of the demise of OS/2. Although it had an infinitely better architecture than Windows, OS/2 was killed off by some of the worst strategic and marketing decisions in the history of the industry. Its brief and unhappy existence was marked by a lack of drivers and hardware support, a lack of development tools, and a lack of applications. In typical IBM fashion the end user was expected to manually edit a lengthy CONFIG.SYS file (four pages or more of text-based and cryptic configuration items) to configure the system. Partnerships with hardware vendors to ship OS/2 with systems that couldn't run it properly made the problem even worse, and disastrously bad marketing drove the final nail into OS/2's coffin. After this debacle IBM withdrew from the desktop software market which they had never really understood, in spite of having created the original IBM PC. After the split of MS and IBM, MS hired Cutler (and a small team) to further develop NT and make it competitive with UNIX. After a while, Cutler left DEC and went to work full time for MS developing and extending the NT kernel Quote:
Quote:
Quote:
__________________
My site: http://microchip.bplaced.net My repo: http://download.opensuse.org/repositories/home:/microchip8 SUSE Unbound Forum: http://suseunbound.lefora.com Do coders dream of sheep() ? |
|
||||
|
Also, this discussion is pointless and way out of context with the thread, which is about Linux being bloated not about NT or OS/2. So, I'll do just what you used to do in the past... call you a "master of spinning words and contradictions"
__________________
My site: http://microchip.bplaced.net My repo: http://download.opensuse.org/repositories/home:/microchip8 SUSE Unbound Forum: http://suseunbound.lefora.com Do coders dream of sheep() ? |
|
|||
|
Quote:
![]() Unlike WW2 etc, the business arrangements between IBM and MicroSoft, when the latter was supposedly working on OS/2, are not well documented. You clearly don't know about that since you continually refer to "collaboration" and "partnership". You talk about it as some sort of joint open-source project between two equal companies, without any consideration of contractual arrangements, or who owned what. It wasn't, but those arrangements (or lack of) between IBM and Mcrosoft are key to what really happened. You say little about the first two versions of OS/2, or about the fact that the first product was released too early, presumably to leverage hardware sales, i.e. a solution looking for a problem. The PC market wasn't ready for multitasking and the applications weren't there to use it. It's a pity that you feel it necessary to just pour out such a long post, and several on the trot, in the hope that "never mind the quality, just feel the width" will win the debate, for winning at all costs seems to be your main objective. That rewriting of history is a curious mixture of some facts I can agree with, and microchip's opinions. It really isn't worth unravelling. It reminds me of the crapware that PC manufactures load onto new machines. You could just consider posting the links of your sources next time, without the embellishment, instead of just giving us a load of anecdotal stuff that you read about on the internet etc. BTW, you won't find too many of the real facts being unearthed by the media of the time, mainly because the US press corps were generally too respectful of the business sector then - unlike those in Europe and the UK in particular. The report on that visit to Microsoft was fairly typical - just print what was said - no really tough questioning or investigation. Quote:
|
|
|||
|
A small footnote:
There's a much better article on the development of Windows NT written by Mark Russinovich, who at the time developed a lot of very useful Windows utilities on a site called Sysinternals. Russinovich now works for Microsoft. Windows NT and VMS: The Rest of the Story |
|
||||||
|
Quote:
![]() Quote:
Quote:
Quote:
Quote:
Quote:
__________________
My site: http://microchip.bplaced.net My repo: http://download.opensuse.org/repositories/home:/microchip8 SUSE Unbound Forum: http://suseunbound.lefora.com Do coders dream of sheep() ? |
|
||||
|
Hey folks, ... this thread is getting a bit too hot.
Please read again our rules, ... in particular note this announcement we made yesterday: openSUSE forums Rules-of-Conduct reminder - openSUSE Forums To give this a chance to cool down, I'm closing this thread to web based users for a while, and I ask that NNTP users do NOT reply to this thread. Thank you. |
![]() |
|
| Bookmarks |
| Thread Tools | |
| Display Modes | |
|
|